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Summary
The two-tier banking system was (newly) born in Hungary in 1987. The advent of 
political changes arrived when the over-indebted country had been left without re-
serves, and nearly went bankrupt. From such a difficult position a functioning bank-
ing system had to be built up after the first free elections held in 1990. During the 
second term, between 1994 and 1998, most of the Hungarian banks were privatised 
(after consolidation of the individual banks during the first government with the help 
of government bonds.) In the third cycle there appeared to be too many banks in 
the country, and most of them were below the optimum. In the period between 2002 
and 2010, banks flourished and created a credit boom based on foreign currency. 
Following the international financial crisis this led to great troubles. The forint was 
devaluated against the Swiss franc, and numerous clients became insolvent and lost 
their homes. The government elected in 2010 made efforts at resolving the situation 
to help citizens by programmes including several steps. Banks were required to take 
part in this effort by paying special taxes and for a time this cut back on their profit-
ability. The last three governments since 2010 modified the deconcentrated banking 
structure and repurchased some of the previously privatised banks. In 2013 the gov-
ernment set the goal of increasing the share of Hungarian-owned banks to above 50%, 
which was achieved in 2019. The profitability of banks has recovered, and their capital 
position is now strong. The National Bank of Hungary fulfils the supervisory function. 
Through its monetary policy, unorthodox measures and credit programmes, it helps 
the smooth functioning of the sector and thus the financing of Hungarian SME’s.
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Introduction 
The two-tier banking system was born in Hungary in 1987, a few years before the 
1989–1990 political change of regime led to a new, democratic society and a mar-
ket economy. The importance of financial matters became clear very soon. Short-
term foreign deposits (which the National Bank of Hungary, MNB recognised as “re-
serves”) left the country in the springof 1990, a few weeks before the final elections. 
The National Bank did not have a sufficient amount of foreign currency to finance 
debt service to the country’s creditors. The public promise made by the reform politi-
cians of the Hungarian Democratic Forum on television to fulfill debt service if they 
were elected finally convinced investors to return the money. 
Initial years:  1990–1991
All this awakened Hungarians to the importance of the banking system and monetary 
and finances for the country. Experienced in international banking, Pál Tar, a friend 
and adviser of Prime Minister József Antall, convinced him to place emphasis on this 
sector. A Bank Privatisation Committee was established with the task to consolidate 
the existing system and prepare the privatisation of banks. (Actually, the Committee 
was not engaged in privatisation, but created the legal framework for the genuinely 
market-conform functioning of commercial banking in the country.)
The system existing in 1990 comprised the following members: three commer-
cial banks detached from the MNB : the Hungarian Credit Bank (Magyar Hitelbank, 
MHB), the National Commercial and Credit Bank (Országos Kereskedelmi és Hitel-
bank, OKHB) and Budapest Bank (BB); completed by the Foreign Trade Bank (Mag-
yar Kereskedelmi Bank, MKB), the General Banking and Trust Ltd. (Általános Ér-
tékforgalmi Bank), OTP (the National Savings Bank), the network of smaller saving 
co-operatives, and a few smaller joint venture banks (Citibank, CIB, Unicbank). Later 
on, new Hungarian banks (e.g. Ybl Bank, the first private bank after 1990 in Hungar-
ian hands) were also established. At the beginning, the legal regulation of the sector 
was very poor. The Banking Act was only passed by the Hungarian National Assembly 
at the end of 1991.
Today it is difficult to imagine how little idea the Hungarian economists and fi-
nancial specialist of the time had about the functioning of a genuine commercial 
bank in the 1980’s. Very few old experts had still been living who had some practice 
in banking before the nationalisation of banks in Hungary (Act XXX of 1947). A few 
employees of the National Bank at the arbitrage department had some understanding 
of foreign exchange transactions, but 40 years of a monolithic banking system nearly 
killed all the simple routines which any clerk in an Austrian or French bank had. In 
the Finance Research Institute young colleagues studied the specialised literature and 
they became members of the Committee that established the two- tier banking system 
recommended by Finance Minister István Hetényi. However, there was nowhere to 
learn the necessary expertise in everyday activity from. Not to mention the methods 
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and practices of surveillance and supervision. Board-members who were supposed to 
fulfil the role of internal control at banks were also people without any specific practi-
cal banking knowledge. To be quite honest, it was a surprise for us when similar prob-
lems turned out even in the most advanced market economies later on. The investiga-
tion after the collapse of the Lehman Brothers made it clear that the external board 
members did not have any useful knowledge on banking business at this big US bank. 
In the 1980’s the World Bank assisted a due diligence of Hungarian banks. Un-
der severe banking confidentiality, some of the members in the banking supervisory 
group at the Finance Ministry were actually aware of the amount of non-performing 
assets held by big Hungarian commercial banks. Everybody was afraid of the public 
reaction when and if it were disclosed that Hungarian banks wer technically bankrupt. 
The causes of the disastrous shortage of capital were rooted in the situation inherited 
from the socialist economy planning mechanism. The so-called New Economic Mecha-
nism adopted in 1968 was insufficient for either convertibility or the internal capitalisa-
tion of enterprises. The firms no longer received sufficient working capital for their ac-
tivities from the state when they were declared to be autonomous. Only the MNB’s credit 
lines helped bridge the shortage of capital. Firms were burdened by credits. Inadequate 
capital represented the legacy of the past. And the future was not rosy at all.
Parallel to the capital shortage of Hungarian firms, their export partners’ solvency 
abroad was also a big problem. The buyers of Hungarian industrial and agricultural 
products were mostly firms in former socialist countries, themselves insolvent as a 
result of the political changes in their own countries. They could not pay for the 
exported Hungarian goods, so our firms also became insolvent. This led to the non-
performing assets in our banks. Due to budget constraints, the Finance Ministry did 
not allow to create some reserves for covering the losses, accounting it as cost. So the 
picture was very gloomy. 
At the beginning of 1991, the government commissioned a minister without port-
folio responsible for the banking sector, who, with the help of a team of Hungarian 
experts, drafted a modern banking regulation which was handed in and accepted 
by the Parliament at the end of the year. This revealed the genuine portfolios of big 
Hungarian banks. The Banking Supervision established by the Banking Act started to 
control and survey the activity of the banks. It was not an easy task, because of lack of 
professional employees, both in the Supervision and in the banks themselves.
The public that time was not concerned with the professional issues of the con-
ducting of banking business but of the privatisation of the banks. This process was not 
in the competence of the Supervision but in the hands of the Finance Ministry. 
In 1991 the Banking Committee consulted a lot of Hungarian and foreign financial 
experts and the Banking Association representatives about the amount of potential 
losses, and the methods and forms of the consolidation of the Hungarian banks. The 
Supervision had completed its task by showing the realistic capital situation of banks. 
It became clear that the state could not sell them in their current position for any sig-
nificant amount of money although the budget and the debt situation of the country 
would have demanded capital income from privatisation, possibly in foreign currency. 
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The Finance Ministry therefore worked out different steps for the consolidation 
of banks’ capitalisation. This included credit-consolidation, client-consolidation and bank-
consolidation, by removing non-performing loans from banks’ portfolios in exchange 
of long-term government bonds. In the first step a buyout was performed, the second 
one included raising the capital of state banks by adding long-term state securities to the 
initial capital, followed by writing off non-performing loans. Client consolidation was 
a direct help offered by the state to the clients of banks making them capable of debt 
service.
In the deteriorating situation two main factors played a role: the collapse of East-
ern-European markets and the fundamental ideology of market economy. Both the ruling 
and the opposition parties based their policies on belief in the allocating function of 
the market forces. (In this spirit sometimes Hungary set stricter than necessary rules; 
for instance in the Bankruptcy Act.) Most experts pressed for privatisation. Liberal 
economists in the country firmly believed that the quicker state ownership is replaced 
by private the better. The other dilemma was also decisive: Should we invite strategic 
or portfolio investors as bank owners? Liberal politicians stressed that only strategic 
foreign investors have the required professionalism at Hungarian banks. (It was delib-
erately disregarded that the realised seniorage through lending and money generation 
included in the future profit would then also belong to the foreign owners.)
On the other hand, some who advocated “etatist” views did not understand the 
pressure made by both private and international financial institutions. The latter pre-
ferred foreign ownership, in other words, selling the Hungarian capital for foreign 
exchange to increase the country’s reserves. Looking back, it seems a deliberate ac-
tion to get hold of this profitable sector in transition economies for the benefit of for-
eign owners. But one has to acknowledge that it happened at the same in every CEE 
country, partly because of the inherited socialist capital shortage seen everywhere, 
and partly due to the lack of professional banking knowledge. But the ratio of foreign 
ownership at banks in Hungary was even higher than in the other countries of the re-
gion. (Hungary has always been a “trailblazer” or a “good pupil” during Central and 
Eastern European transformation.)
The first government after the change of regime would have preferred Hungar-
ian ownership, and if foreign ownership was a must, at best they should be portfolio 
investors. But this strategy was only successful at OTP, where the management itself 
had been working according to a strategy for privatisation. It must be added that 
OTP did not need a large amount of money in consolidation, as it did not perform 
significant corporate lending activity and thus did not realise considerable losses, and 
so the sale of its capital was far easier. All the same OTP, too, received consolidation 
bonds, and they may have used them for technical development to get the necessary 
improvement in modernisation of the bank. It was actually a hidden assistance to the 
big Hungarian bank to become competitive.
OTP had a different problem: it had great many housing credits at very low, state-
guaranteed interest. This was a big burden, although not for the bank, but for the 
guarantor, the State Treasury. The problem had been solved by a statute that allowed 
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the repayment of loans at a large discount. This offer was accepted by the large major-
ity of the debtors. (The superfluous nature of the formerly granted government-guar-
anteed loans at low interest rate became obvious: most people actually had the money 
required to buy their homes, and they simply enjoyed the cheap loans, as money in 
deposit brought higher interest rates than the repayment of the subsidised loans.) 
As an interesting fact it is worth mentioning that for those who were unable to repay 
half of their loans, the interest rate was unilaterally raised five times the original. But 
the (few) who were aware of the legal proceedings and went to court won the lawsuits 
against the state. So the consolidation made Hungarian banks “marriageable”, that is, 
ready for sale in the framework of privatisation. 
When banks were offerd for sale, the immaterial part of the capital was not taken 
into consideration in the price. (For instance in 1994, MKB’s sales price was 100%, 
which only included the clientele, and the expertise of the management was not at 
all included in the price. True, the buyer simply wanted a banking licence.) The sale 
of Hungarian banks to state-owned or international banks (e.g. the EIB) can hardly 
be considered genuine privatisation. For example, the Landesbanks of Germany were 
institutions based on public and not private law. The EIB is an institution based on 
interstate contract. So why was this considered “privatisation” and how does the mar-
ket’s magical “private” ownership work through them? 
Nevertheless, privatisation and bank consolidation are seen as success stories both 
by Hungarian liberal economists and international experts. To evaluate consolida-
tion, let us quote a Hungarian researcher: “There are more than one answers to the 
question of whether the final bill for the major state bank rescue programme was too 
much, at around USD 4 billion or 10% of Hungary’s annual GDP. If we consider that 
this amounted to almost one tenth of the country’s annual gross national product, 
then the burden seems considerable. If, on the other hand, we consider that with-
out the state’s rescue plan the banking system would have collapsed, and would have 
dragged along the entire economy, then we can safely say that the government chose 
the lesser of two evils” (Várhegyi, 2019, p. 47).
 
Privatisation: 1994–1997
Bank privatisation only accelerated after 1994 and had nearly been completed by 
1997. By the millennium there had been 42 credit institutions, with foreigners hold-
ing majority in 33 banks. In addition to commercial banks, there were nearly 200 
small Hungarian savings and credit co-operatives with limited licences. Their market 
share was fairly small up to 2019.
The period between 1994 and 1997 can be characterized by foreign ownership of 
the Hungarian banking system.
How can the role and importance of foreign ownership in banks be evaluated? In 
the 2000’s one could often read praises of foreign-owned banks, claiming that they 
defended the country from the effects of the 1998 international emerging-market 
crisis. But the pros and cons show a different picture.
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As an ECB document reads: “Foreign ownership may have also been one of the im-
portant factors that recently helped shelter accession countries’ banking and financial 
sectors from spill-overs from the crises in other emerging markets. However, foreign 
ownership was not entirely without drawbacks. For example, in many of the foreign-
owned banks, trading and other key activities were shifted to the headquarters, so 
that the subsidiaries in the accession countries lost some of their important functions. 
Moreover, the stability of the system would now depend largely on the stability of the 
home institutions as well as the home regulators. It was also pointed out that the pres-
ence of foreign-owned banks would in itself not guarantee stability in the banking sys-
tem, as evidenced by the fact that a relatively high level of non-performing loans had 
persisted even in foreign-owned banks. Finally, foreign ownership should also not be 
seen as necessarily perpetual as disinvestment – for example, as a result of a domestic 
crisis or a change in the commercial strategy of the owner – always remains a possibil-
ity, and indeed disinvestment in accession countries by a strategic foreign owner had 
already occurred” (ECB, 2002, p. 10).
The role of the management is always critical. Sometimes foreign strategic own-
ers did not send the most qualified persons to the banks they had purchased, and 
changed them too often. Measured by achievement and the economic successes of 
bank CEO’s, it turns out that Hungarian CEO’s were often better than the foreign 
directors.
The system also included a few newly established (“green grass”) banks. At around 
the turn of the millennium, specialized institutions also existed in the Hungarian 
banking sector. The activities and performance of the state-owned Land Credit and 
Mortgage Bank and the Hungarian Development Bank were primarily driven by gov-
ernment programmes, which contributed to high growth in their balance sheet to-
tal. Nevertheless, the market share of specialised credit institutions was still relatively 
modest, amounting to only 6% in 2001.
The year 2001 witnessed only minor changes in the ownership structure in the 
Hungarian banking system. The share of state ownership within residents’ domestic 
equity holdings rose at the expense of credit institutions, enterprises and individuals. 
Foreign ownership, in the middle of 1990’s decreased to 63%, but it was still very high. 
Excluding the Hungarian Development Bank, a special-purpose state development 
institution, and only including commercial banks, foreign ownership amounted to 
76% (ECB, 2002).
Bank failures
In the early stages of building the commercial banking system in Hungary in 
the 1990’s, only a very few banks went bankrupt. Such cases (Ybl Bank, West LB, 
Gyomaendrőd Savings Cooperative) were due to the absence of professionalism, and 
fraud also played a role. Ybl Bank was established for the purposes of the planned 
World Expo, which ultimately did not take place in 1992. The debtors could not 
repay the loans taken for building new hotels and similar investment projects. The 
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bank’s portfolio deteriorated, and its capital was shrinking. To restore liquidity, the 
leadership of the bank used bogus contracts with various ministries and state institu-
tions to use their temporarily disposable money for buying state bonds. For their 
“clients”, i.e. ministries, it was not allowed to deposit their temporarily disposable 
money in commercial bank deposits, but it was legal to commission a bank to buy 
government bonds for them. This was a legal loophole, but only bogus contracts. 
Ministries should have known that there were no government bonds for sale in the 
market. But in such contracts there was a paragraph guaranteeing market interest rates 
for the commissioned bank in any case. Interest rates were very high because of peak-
ing inflation. It was absolutely flagrant that even the Finance Ministry had been in-
volved in such tricky businesses to get some extra money. They used it to compensate 
the overburdened staff for overwork. In their defence they claimed that it was very 
difficult to retain the workforce for the administrative staff in the ministry. Anyone 
with some financial knowledge went to work for better paying, newly created banks 
and other financial institutions (Botos, 1996). Bank crashes challenged the central 
budget, which had already been overstretched. It was clear that the government 
would not allow major losses in the depositors’ money, as that would “go against” the 
recent political changes. People had no practice in a functioning market economy, 
and were unable to assess the possible risks at banks. They were grown up in a cli-
mate with huge posters on the walls of OTP reading: “Deposits are guaranteed by the 
state.” So bank crashes urged the establishment of a Deposit Insurance Fund, which 
was anyhow foreseen in the Banking Act of 1991. (“The main responsibility of the 
Deposit Insurance Fund is to compensate depositors if the Authority has delivered 
its decision adopted under Section 33(1) of the Credit Institutions Act”.) The fee for 
deposit insurance came from the banking community, so any subsequent problems 
remained to be solved at the taxpayers’ cost.
After 1993, certain amendments were made (e.g. the operative functions of the 
Investment Insurance Fund were taken over), but since then a bank failure may not 
cause huge losses to an ordinary depositor. (Small investors are now also protected by 
the Investment Insurance Fund.)
One of the major bankruptcies in the second half of the 1990s was the case of Posta-
bank (SAO, 1999; 2003). The accumulated losses in this bank were so grea that special 
state intervention was required. The audit performed by the State Audit Office (SAO) 
after the collapse of Postabank shed light on a lot of moral, regulating and political 
problems. The supervision and regulation of banks have always been based on the 
law-abiding behaviour of the market actors. As Gerald Corrigan, director at the New 
York Fed, once said: if the leadership in a bank wants to mislead the supervision, it 
can always easily do it (Botos, 1996). This is why the moral standard of the management 
is so iportant. In the case of Postabank, a large number of mistakes were traceable 
to the management behaviour. (The extremely lenient punishment imposed on the 
CO of the bank after the trials and the investigation by the State Audit Office were 
absolutely shocking.) In addition to the bank’s management, politicians also played 
a role in preventing the Supervision’s activity when they wanted to performe on-site 
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inspection. It was against the law to intervene in the Banking Supervision’s activity by 
any external authority or person, but as the Supervision was dependant on the govern-
ment, it did not have sufficient power to combat pressure. It may be credited to the 
leadership of the Supervision that they remained firm during the disclosure of the 
“ownership structure”. The management wanted to conceal the investors of the bank 
who would strengthen the capital position of the institution. There was a suspicion 
that the management wanted to help them by using a man of straw, and perform a 
kind of “baron Munchausen” escape, who pulled himself out of the situation by his 
own hair. The bank made a lot of similar other tricks, e.g. offering cheap and higher 
amounts of loans than requested by clients, even to parish clerks, if they deposited the 
money above the loan amount as subordinated capital. This was to raise capital from 
deposits made by the clients. Many other procedural problems were discovered during 
the audit. The bail-out cost for the public more than HUF 150 billion (and the CO’s 
legal punishment was only HUF 3 million, absolutely abhorring.)
A change in the legal status of the banking supervision and its incorporation in 
the National Bank has strengthened its position against everyday political influences.
The 1990’s and the following decade was a period of illusions. The firm belief in 
market economy, the belief that the West would help us adapt to the market chal-
lenges, and perhaps reduce our debt in return for the Paneuropean Picnic turned into 
disappointment. Part of the talented liberal economists continued to insist on their 
belief that the best solution for all our problems was the “marketisation” of all aspects 
of life and first of all, the economy. The less the state intervention, the better, they 
claimed. In banking the clearest sign of that ideology was reflected in giving increas-
ing ground to foreign banks in the internal market and in minimising state owner-
ship. 
The other scenario:  1998–2002
A more conservative, patriotist economic policy was implemented in the period un-
der the Fidesz government between 1998 and 2002. This government had a scenario 
that differed from that of liberal economists. Without a complex evaluation of the 
economic situation of that period, only one aspect, which deserves special attention, 
is discussed here: economic development based on domestic factors. 
Although the export-capacity of the country was as important as before, the gov-
ernment also stressed the role of the internal market. A glimpse at the macro-econom-
ic data of the time reveals that the country had not reached the pre-transition levels 
by 1998 in many respects. Only GDP had reached the level of 1990 by 1999, but wages 
had only in 2002, and pensions in 2004. Thus there was insufficient demand because 
of the low level of personal incomes. There was only one option to boost internal 
demand: by offering subsidies to home-building. Families were planning new houses and 
buying new flats. The construction industry flourished. (It is remarkable that this was 
also the method applied in the US, in the form of low-interest rate lons to support 
home-building.) The growth-rate was surprisingly high; the export surplus consoli-
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dated the external balance, so the indebtedness of the country decreased in relative 
terms. No wonder the political leaders were convinced they would be re-elected in 
2002. But as mentioned earlier, wages and pensions were still lagging behind, and 
this explains the lost election of 2002. In their living standards, voters did not feel the 
government’s undeniable macroeconomic achievements. 
Repeatied liberal line:  2002–2010
After the conservatives’ lost 2002 elections the country returned to the liberal market 
economists’ trajectory.
In the years after 1990, a decreasing concentration was seen in banking. By the 
end of the nineties, several acquisitions and mergers had taken place and resulted 
in concentration increase as some saving co-operatives had ceased their operation, 
had merged or had transformed into banks. Based on a study by McKinsey and Com-
pany, in 2005 the market share of the three biggest banks was 43.8% in Hungary, 
while the HHI for the whole sector was 1007. What concerns the banking industry’s 
ownership structure, state ownership in the banks was below 20%. State banks’ share 
was about 10%
Balázs Zsámboki assess the situation in the pre-accession stage of the banking 
sector as follows: “With regard to the current level of balance sheet total, there 
appear to be too many banks, implying that the average size of banks is below the 
optimum level. However, looking at the density of branches, Hungary is not over-
banked, although technological development will certainly make a few branches 
redundant” (ECB, 2002, p. 113). We may agree with the other statement of Zsám-
boki that the relation between the level of concentration in the banking sector and 
its vulnerability in the case of shocks and crises has not been adequately assessed in 
Hungary so far.
In addition to the structure of the banking sector, growing foreign currency lend-
ing created great problems. This has not been given sufficient emphasis in contem-
porary or current professional supervisors’ publications. Few authors draw attention 
to this dangerous phenomenon, despite the fact that retrospective analyses reveal its 
importance (Lentner, 2015). As an exception, Botos and Halmosi gave an evaluation 
on the risk climate in the second half of the 2000’s: “Inflationary expectations … will 
bring further depreciation. It is hard to precisely establish trends, but we may declare 
that this will bring great suprises for housholds running up huge foreign currency loans” (Bo-
tos and Halmosi, 2009, p. 109, italicised by the author). The subprime crisis came as a 
surprise and also hit Hungarian banking, despite the fact that Hungarian banks were 
not involved in the so called toxic assets business. But lending in foreign currency and 
the coming overvaluation of the Swiss frank made this type of business very costly, con-
cerning redemption for the clients of banks. Many were unable to repay their debts. 
This raised the portfolios of non-performing loans at banks. But the problem which 
was emerging in the society was even greater. Citizens who thought that they had 
found a cheap financing for their housing were divested from their home ownerships 
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and fallen into deep poverty. Discontent was growing and the banks were blamed 
along with the government.
Why did such a very quick growth in lending based on foreign currency happen? 
As was mentioned before, the first Orbán government supported housing from 
the budget. Families with children intending to buy flats or houses, were given subsi-
dies. This idea matched the policy of the incumbent political party, namely that they 
intended to base the society on families instead of the full individualism. (The govern-
ment intended not only to stimulate growth, but also parenting, as the birth rate was 
extremely low in Hungary. Population decline has been threatening the country.) But 
after 2002 the liberal government terminated this type of budget subsidy. Those who 
wanted a new flat had no access to anything else than bank loans. It came in handy 
to offer low interest rateloans from abroad to Hungarian banks, so they started lend-
ing based on Swiss francs. This did not mean that the debtor actually received Swiss 
francs, only the lending transaction was based on Swiss franc credit lines taken by the 
banks (Lentner, 2015). That way they realized an extra margin and an extra profit. 
Profitability of the banking sector was soaring.
But the country’s macro-economic situation deteriorated year by year in this pe-
riod. In relative terms, state indebtedness strated to rise again to the pre-1990 levels, 
and deficits were high. Vulnerability to external financing was intensive. Despite all of 
that, the banking sector had flourished up to the eruption of the crisis. Due to interna-
tional financial problems, the country had to turn to the IMF again to be able to fulfil 
its obligations to the rest of the world. (The first Orbán Government terminated the 
contract.) People’s living standard failed to improve and housing problems were chal-
lenging. This is why 2010 brought changes in the political leadership of the country.
After 2010
After the eruption of the crisis relate to the Swiss franc started to revaluate and the 
Hungarian forint was devaluated. The loans denominated in Swiss franc became very 
costly, and nevertheless, Swiss franc loans expanded even in the couple of months 
after the outbreak of the lending crisis. Only the elections brought radical stop.
The new government very soon banned forex-based lending, and the IMF-contract, 
introduced extra taxes on banks, starting to consolidate the government’s unsound 
budget. The banking tax was under heavy criticism by liberal economists inside and 
outside the country. (While nobody criticised the unhealthy lending activity of foreign-
owned banks in Hungary.)
The government decided to consolidate the banking sector, eliminate the too 
much banks, create a healthy concentration in the savings co-operate sector, raise a 
bit – maybe only for temporarily – the share of the state-owned banks. 
The government set a goal in 2013 to raise the share of Hungarian-owned banks 
above 50%. Some foreign banks left the country, as a consequence of deteriorating 
profitability (caused by bank taxes) and Hungarian-controlled (or owned) banks 
gained ground.
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Table 1: Foreign and government ownership, 1995–2013











22% 75% 85% 83% 59% 61% 6% 3% 4%
Source: Cull et al., 2017
In 2012, MFB was ordered by the state to buy out the stake of Germany’s DZ Bank 
in the umbrella bank of the savings co-operatives, so that it could act as an “integra-
tor” of saving co-operatives. The government intended to unite savings co-operatives 
into a “commercial bank” with a nationwide network (which was actually performed 
in 2019).
In 2014 the state purchased MKB Bank from its Bavarian owner. In 2015, Budapest 
Bank was also bought by state-owned MFB on behalf of the Hungarian government 
from its American owner GE (which was planning its further privatisation).
The state agreed with the owners of Erste Bank to purchase a stake in the bank, 
through the Corvinus Investment Zrt., parallel with EBRD (each having a 15% share).
The government promised by an aggreeement with the EBRD to stop introducing un-
favorable measures against banking activity in Hungary. Based on the balance sheets 
share of the banks under Hungarian management, the ratio was raised in seven years 
from 13.55 to 55.7%. So the government has achieved the aim to bring the share of 
Hungarian-owned banks above 50%.
Some critics were recently published against the banks having Hungarian own-
ers (and management), that they are under controll of economic forces close to the 
government. “From the perspective of the future stability of the banking system, two 
crucial questions arise: first, whether the newly nationalised credit institutions have 
sufficiently well-capitalised owners to stand firm should the need arise; and second, 
what is the impact on prudent bank operations of close interlocking with the centre 
of political power, and how much has the moral hazard been exacerbated” (Várhegyi, 
2019, p. 59). It looks as if the concerns were exaggerated. 
The most recent developments
Let us summarize the situation in the Hungarian banking sector based on the re-
port made for the European Banking Federation: “The Hungarian banking sector 
consists of 69 institutions. Among them are 26 commercial banks, nine foreign bank 
branches, five mortgage banks, four building societies, three specialized banks and 
–as a result of massive consolidation – 22 credit or saving cooperatives. At the end 
of 2017, 50.5% of the banking sector’s shareholding was kept by domestic entities 
with almost two-thirds of that in the hands of the state.The banking sector has 2,420 
branches and employs around 39,000 people (0.88% of the total employment in Hun-
gary). For the country’s population of 9.8 million in 2017, there are 10.5 million bank 
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accounts, 9.1 million payment cards (of which 72% are contactless), 5,100 ATMs and 
136,400 POS terminals. Electronic payments increased dynamically in 2017. The pay-
ment card accepting network grew significantly by 25% which also means that 83% of 
the POS terminals support contactless card acceptance. In 2017, two-thirds of retail 
payments were made by contactless cards. The rate of access to payment accounts by 
internet and mobile banking services increased by 2.5% which means that 82% of 
the payment accounts can be accessed by one of them. The National Bank of Hun-
gary has launched a project to implement a domestic (denominated in HUF) instant 
payment (IP) solution. The new payment system will be available to make payments 
between Hungarian payment accounts within seconds, on a 24/7/365 basis. It will 
also be possible for market participants to provide a range of additional services. The 
IP service will start on 1 July 2019. The new basic infrastructure supports innovative 
payment services. One-third of the banking sector’s total loan portfolio is provided to 
non-financial corporates, one-third to households and organisations closely linked to 
households and one-sixth to the foreign sector (half of it to foreign corporate sector). 
In 2017, corporate lending grew at a rate unseen since the crisis, expanding by more 
than 13% in annual terms, while retail lending almost stagnated with an increase 
slightly over 1%.The deposit value of the banking sector remarkably increased in 2017 
(by 7.7%) in total, each major sector (local state, corporate and household as well as 
foreign) contributed positively.The capital position of the Hungarian banking sector 
is stable. The Tier 1 capital adequacy ratio (CAR) is over 18%, while the total CAR is 
a bit over 20%. In 2017 profits reached a new high in nominal terms, mainly due to 
extraordinary or external factors, before tax ROE remained over 14.5%. Major extra 
contributors to the unexpectedly good performances are the good profitability of 
local banks’ foreign affiliates and releasing impairments. The banking sector has a 
relatively high contribution to the central budget in Hungary. It provides almost 4% 
of the total budget revenue (approximately 1.5% of the GDP), half of it coming from 
sectorial taxes” (Vass, 2018).
The above long list shows that the Hungarian banking sector is for today in a well-
balanced situation, concerning forein and Hungarian ownership. Banks work profit-
ably, have strong capital base. Hopefully the sector will help further on the smoose 
financing the development in our country. The latest data on the activity of the Hun-
garian banking sector are also promising. The most important is how leding was de-
veloping.
We may outline the situation based on the latest Inflation Report by the National 
Bank of Hungary (MNB, 2019).
In 2019 parallel with output and investment, the outstanding loans of the private 
sector exhibited a remarkable expansion during the year – just as we have seen in 
2017 – both in historical and international comparison. There was a rapid growth to 
be seen on the demand side, both in corporate and household lending. The supply 
side was characterised by loosening of credit conditions and price competition. This 
credit expansion was really unprecedented since the crisis already in the preceding 
year, but it strengthened in 2019 further on. 
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The MNB overviewed the structure of changes in loan portfolios. Over the past 
12 months, the outstanding loans of non-financial corporations vis-a-vis the Hungar-
ian financial intermediary system have increased rapidly, by almost 17 percent. By 
international comparison, this is remarkable. Credit expansion primarily occurred in 
longer term loans, with had a maturity of over 1 year. They gave more than two thirds 
of the growth in the credit volume. And the majority of the credit-growth (2/3) was 
offered in HUF. This is favourable from a stability standpoint...
Last year’s contribution of gross fixed capital formation to GDP growth was con-
siderably higher in Hungary than in the other Visegrád countries. Business cycles 
and corporate lending in the Visegrád countries have typically been in sync in the 
past decades. This is explained by the fact that there must be country-specific factors 
behind the extremely rapid increase in lending seen in Hungary at present compared 
to other countries of the region. 
Growth in corporate credit is broad-based in all sectors of the economy. Loans for 
the manufacturing sector has shown the largest increase. Expansion in landing in the 
manufacturing happened first of all by the borrowing of several international corpo-
rations in Hungary, linked to their Hungarian projects. The second sector included 
the firms providing financial and insurance services. The credit demand of the agri-
cultural sector was also supported by the supplementary financing of EU transfers. 
The robust activity in construction and the real estate sector raised the credit portfolio 
of these sectors too, but a lesser degree. This was the consequence of the investment 
activity of real estate funds. Developments in the CRE market also affect the functioning 
of the financial system. This is primarily due to the fact that most banks’ corporate 
loan portfolios are CRE-collateralised loans, accounting for almost 40 per cent of 
the portfolios in Hungary in 2018. The Hungarian corporate sector’s low aggregate 
indebtedness provides further room for rapid credit expansion. 
 In the household sector the portfolio had not increased until 2017, as repayments 
consistently exceeded disbursements. This is because these loans were annuity loans: 
as the maturity of loans disbursed before the crisis progresses – accounting for a sub-
stantial proportion of existing debt – the share of principal repayments grow progres-
sively in the monthly instalments paid by debtors. From mid-2017, however, the new 
credit outflows already exceed the repayments of existing contracts, and the outstand-
ing borrowing of households began to grow. It should be emphasised that lending 
tends to exert its impact primarily in household investment rather than consumption. 
The current growth is driven by the double-digit increase in new housing and per-
sonal loans. In addition to the low interest environment, demand is supported by the 
family policy programmes of the government, such as the Family Housing Allowance 
(CSOK) available since 2016 – and the extension thereof – and the Prenatal Baby Sup-
port available since July 2019. The number of home purchases from credit increased 
over the past few years, although still less than one half of all home purchases are 
financed with credit. However, not only housing loans, but also personal loans can 
finance housing investment, despite the fact that the cost associated with personal 
loans is still three times higher than that of mortgage loans. But fast loan assessment 
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and disbursement encourage households to take out personal loans for lower-value 
housing purposes as well. The nearly 7% expansion in household lending is driven by 
demand: supply conditions have not eased significantly since the crisis. 
The over-indebtedness is controlled by the debt cap rules introduced in 2015 which 
have been recalibrated several times since. This prevents excessive indebtedness. 
Due to the relatively high share of variable-rate loans, debtors in both the house-
hold and the corporate sector are sensitive to interest rate fluctuations. The consumer 
credits-takers are often not aware enough of the risk. The MNB issued therefore a 
recommendation to financial institutions, trying to suggest them to convince the most 
affected customers who have variable-rate mortgage loans, to change a transition to a 
fixed-rate scheme with an amendment to the already existing contract.
On the whole, thanks to the favourable financing environment and buoyant invest-
ment demand, rapid expansion may be expected to continue both in the corporate 
and in the household sector in Hungary in the coming period. 
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